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Ⅰ. Extraterritoriality in Financial Regulation
Two decades ago commentators heralded the new era of financial 
globalization by declaring that we were witnessing the “end of geography.”1)  
The vision at the time was one wherein ever-greater harmonization of the 
global regulatory framework would emerge to match the growth of truly 
global financial institutions.  Much less attention has been paid, however, to 
the possibility that various nations would not go along with the global 
aspirations of their financial institutions quite so willingly—at least when it 
comes to how the corresponding global rules might affect their direct 
domestic interests.
Sure enough, and despite well intentioned promises by The Group of 
Twenty (G20) of more closely coordinated global action to reform financial 
regulation,2) we now see that unilateral or regionally exclusive measures are 
again being adopted by various nations, including the United States, in 
ways that affect the conduct and operations of financial institutions that had 
often assumed they would be governed by the rules of their home countries 
alone.  The reforms being undertaken often diverge from, or directly conflict 
 1) E.g., RICHARD O’BRIEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: THE END OF GEOGRAPHY (1992).
 2) A declaration of determination to "work together" is the cornerstone of the "Seoul Action Plan," aimed 
at "comprehensive, cooperative and country-specific policy actions," including a commitment to "core elem
ents of a new financial regulatory framework," which was announced in the midst of the Global Financial 
Crisis, and it has remained the aspiration through subsequent leaders’ meetings of the G20 since then. 
Group of Twenty (G20), G20 Seoul Summit Leaders’ Declaration (Nov. 11-12, 2010), http://www.g20.utoro
nto.ca/2010/g20seoul.pdf. See also Group of Twenty, Cannes Summit Final Declaration–Building Our Com
mon Future: Renewed Collective Action for the Benefit of All (Nov. 3-4, 2011), http://www.g20.utoronto.c
a/2011/2011-cannes-declaration-111104-en.html Group of Twenty, Declaration of the Summit on Financial 
Markets and the World Economy (Nov. 15, 2008), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/relea
ses/2008/11/20081115-1.html Group of Twenty, G20 Leaders Declaration (June 18-19, 2012), available at 
http://g20.org/images/stories/docs/g20/conclu/ G20_Leaders_Declaration_2012_1.pdf Group of Twenty, Th
e G-20 Toronto Summit Declaration (June 26-27, 2010), http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/g20/2010/g20_declarati
on_en.pdf. 
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with, those being adopted by other financial centers.3) The result can be the 
application to specific financial institutions or activities of inconsistent or 
conflicting rules. This is what makes extraterritorial regulation so 
controversial.
Whenever a nation or region takes unilateral action affecting global banks, 
this action will have extraterritorial effect in one of two principal ways:
1. Rules imposed by Nation A on Global Bank X, headquartered in 
Nation A, constrain the operations of Global Bank X in other 
countries, irrespective of the rules of those other countries, 
unless Nation A explicitly states that its rules do not apply to 
actions by Global Bank X in other countries even if these actions 
have implications for the operations in Nation A.
2. Rules imposed by Nation A on Global Bank Y, headquartered in 
Nation B, will have extraterritorial effect even if they are stated 
to apply solely to the operations of Bank Y in Nation A, if the 
operations of Bank Y are actually integrated across borders.4) 
 3) Although the United States has led in reforming its financial regulation, other major financial centers includ
ing Europe and the United Kingdom have also undertaken major reforms, or are in the process of doing 
so. There are substantial divergences between the various approaches adopted. In the United States, for 
example, the Volcker Rule would enforce a separation between traditional, deposit-taking banking organiz
ations and those that engage in proprietary trading and private equity investment (see infra text accompan
ying notes 46-53). In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, the government is preparing to apply the 
recommendations of the Vickers Report, which would not enforce complete separation but would rather 
"ring fence"the deposit-taking elements of a financial conglomerate from its more risky securities trading 
elements. See, e.g., Indep. Comm’n on Banking, Final Report:  Recommendations (2011) [hereinafter Vick
ers Report], available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/ICB-Final-Report.pdf. See also, e.g., HM Treas., 
Dep’t for Bus. Innovation & Skills, Banking Reform: Delivering Stability and Supporting a Sustainable Econ
omy (2012) (U.K.), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/whitepaper_banking_ reform_140512.pdf 
(stating British Government proposals for implementation). In Europe, the Liikanen Commission has recent
ly proposed a hybrid of the U.S. and U.K. models. See High-Level Expert Group on Reforming the Struct
ure of the EU Banking Sector, Final Report (2012) (EU) [hereinafter Liikanen Report], available at http://ec.
europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high-level_expert_group/report_en.pdf.
 4) One might break these examples into additional categories as more related institutions become involved.  
For example, even if the operations of Bank Y are not integrated across borders but cross-border transacti
ons between Bank X and Bank Y fall foul of restrictions enacted in Nation A and therefore affect the 
resulting transaction as it operates in Nation B. But the two major examples described above will suffice 
for present purposes.
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As we will see, the examples of Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule and over the 
counter (OTC) derivatives rules demonstrate both forms of 
extraterritoriality. 
Of course, the picture becomes much more complicated if Nations B, C, D, 
etc., also impose rules with extraterritorial effect.5)  A good example might 
well be developing as far as the structural approaches of the U.S., United 
Kingdom (U.K.) and Europe are concerned.  Under reforms currently 
proposed or already being implemented, the United States would separate 
traditional banking from proprietary trading activities (Volcker Rule);6) the 
U.K. would isolate retail banking from commercial and investment banking 
(Vickers Rule),7) and Europe will likely be applying a variation of one or 
both of these models if it follows the recommendations of the Liikanen 
Committee.8) If Global Bank X is headquartered in New York, Global Bank 
Y is headquartered in London, and Global Bank Z is headquartered in 
Frankfurt, yet all three banks compete directly with each other in the U.S., 
U.K. and Germany, which rules will apply? Without uniformity, very skillful 
harmonization, or consistent deference to home state rules, extraterritorial 
and arbitrary restrictions of one form or another will be almost inevitable.
Ⅱ. Recent United States Reforms
The audience will be familiar with the fact that the U.S. Congress enacted 
 5) See Memorandum from the Inst. of Int’l Fin. to the Fin. Stability Bd.: Containing Extraterritoriality to Prom
ote Financial Stability (Oct. 2, 2012) (on file with author), available at http://www.iif.com/ regulatory/articl
e+1133.php.
 6) See generally infra text accompanying notes 45-52.
 7) See Vickers Report, supra note 3.
 8) See Liikanen Report, supra note 3. See also, e.g., Patrick Jenkins & Brooke Masters, EU Banks Face Ringfe
nce on Trading Assets, Fin. Times (Sept. 9, 2012) (U.K.), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ be221adc-f91e-1
1e1-8d92-00144feabdc0.html#axzz27RsLQEV3.  
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and the U.S.President signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.9) Throughout its passage, 
Presidential signature on July 21, 2010, and subsequent amplification via 
agency rulemaking, the Dodd-Frank Act has remained a major source of 
political controversy in the U.S.This is hardly surprising, not only because 
of the comprehensive nature of the reforms embraced in the 848-page 
statute,10)—so far generating 8,483 pages of regulations in an anticipated 
398 separate sets of regulations11) —but also because Americans are deeply 
divided concerning the proper role of regulation in the financial markets.
The sweep of reforms encompassed by Dodd-Frank is enormous. These 
reforms range from addressing the macroprudential issues of financial 
stability and systemic risk to detailed rules on matters like mortgage 
lending and underwriting, market conduct and, of course, two of the most 
visible matters of concern for foreign bankers, namely the Volcker Rule, 
designed to force banks out of proprietary trading, hedge funds and private 
equity, and the creation of a new regulatory regime for domestic and global 
derivatives transactions. In nearly all areas, Congress delegated the 
responsibility of developing the details for implementing these requirements 
to the financial regulators themselves. This rulemaking process is 
unprecedented in its breadth and complexity and remains far from complete.12) 
Although not yet fully implemented, the reforms are nevertheless fairly 
well advanced. Important new regulatory entities have been created, most 
 9) Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376. 
10) Much has been made of the length of the Dodd-Frank Act, but it should be remembered that it was neces
sary for a good deal of the state to make cross reference and amendments to a very large and complex 
web of financial legislation already accumulated in the U.S. Code.  Many critics of the apparently excessiv
e length of the 2010 Act seemed unfamiliar with this pre-existing statutory morass.
11) See Dodd-Frank Progress Report, Davis Polk, 2-4 (July 18, 2012), http://www.davispolk.com/files/ Publicati
on/15a76992-d82a-4d15-a2db-fcde9effc3d0/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/b82f9d23-0edc-49eb-af02-ff97
ff34bd56/071812_Dodd.Frank.Progress.Report.pdf. 
12) About one third of the rules have been finalized. Id. at 2. Another third have been proposed but not 
yet finalized. Id. The remaining third have not reached the proposal stage. Id.
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notably the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC),13) Office of 
Financial Research (OFR)14) and Consumer Financial Protection Board 
(CFPB).15) Two regulatory agencies—Office of Thrift Supervision and Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)—have been merged into a single 
OCC that continues to enjoy independent status despite being located within 
the organizational structure of the Department of the Treasury (Treasury
).16) The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FED)17) has 
acquired immense new powers over large U.S. and foreign financial 
conglomerates, including, potentially, those that are financial but not 
necessarily actual bank holding companies.18) Finally, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which has long been the regulator for 
state-chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System 
as well as the liquidator or "receiver" for failed banks,19) has also acquired 
broad powers, under certain circumstances, to resolve and liquidate failing 
nonbank financial institutions in addition to banks.20) 
Beyond regulatory restructuring, the Dodd-Frank Act and other recent 
13) Dodd-Frank Act § 111. 
14) Id. § 152. 
15) Id. § 1011. 
16) Id. § 312.  Created in 1863, the OCC charters, regulates, and supervises all national banks, federal savings 
associations and the federal branches and agencies of foreign banks.  To remain independent, the OCC 
generates funding through assessments on the banks supervised and investment income instead of relying 
on Congress. 
17) Federal Reserve Act § 10, 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2006). Created in 1913, the Federal Reserve System operates 
as both the central bank of the United States but also as a national banking regulator and policy maker. 
The Board of Governors is a federal agency that shares responsibility for the entire system with twelve 
regional Federal Reserve Banks. 
18) Dodd-Frank Act § 165.
19) In the United States insured depository institutions do not undergo the general bankruptcy process if they 
fail; instead, they are put through an administrative "receivership" in which the FDIC acts as the receiver. 
Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 1822 (2006). The FDIC is an independent federal agency that insures 
deposits, directly examines and supervises banks and savings institutions, and conducts compliance exams 
to maintain depositor protection. 
20) Under Dodd-Frank, this receivership process is extended to bank holding companies themselves and, pote
ntially, to financial companies designated by the FSOC as "systemically important."  Dodd-Frank Act §§331-
36.
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U.S. statutes and regulations have also begun to effect major changes to the 
substance of banking regulation. Much of this change is not only 
controversial within the U.S. it is also having a direct impact on financial 
services around the world.  Some of the extraterritorial effects of this reform 
are already well known abroad.
The most important were introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act and 
implementing regulations. These include capital adequacy requirements;21) 
efforts to curb growing systemic risk to U.S. and global financial markets;22) 
a broad system of "orderly resolution" or liquidation of failed or failing 
financial institutions;23) and, perhaps of greatest interest to this audience, 
the Volcker Rule and the collateral requirements for swap derivatives.24) 
We should not, however, overlook some other important reforms that have 
had direct and immediate extraterritorial effect: most visible in recent 
months are the anti-money laundering (AML) requirements imposed on 
banks, measures designed to implement sanctions against Iran, and the 
FATCA provisions designed to assist U.S. authorities to trace tax avoidanc
e.25) It should also be borne in mind that most of these reforms, while 
generally conforming to the consensual framework of the G20,26) Financial 
Stability Board (FSB)27) and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
21) Id. § 171 (creating leverage and risk-based capital requirements and commonly known as the "Collins Ame
ndment"); id. § 606 (creating requirements for financial holding companies to remain well capitalized and 
well managed); id. § 616 (creating additional regulations regarding capital levels); id. § 619 (creating prohi
bitions on proprietary trading and certain relationships with hedge funds and private equity funds and 
commonly known as the "Volcker Rule").
22) Id. §§101-76. Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act creates two new federal agencies within the U.S. Treasury 
Department, the Financial Stability Oversight Council and the Office of Financial Research, and grants new 
powers to the Board of Governors related to overseeing nonbank financial companies and bank holding 
companies. Together, the new agencies and authority are intended to aid the identification and supervisio
n of a broader range of companies that could have significant impact on the financial system. 
23) See supra notes 19-20.
24) For fuller discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 46-56.
25) See infra text accompanying notes 37-42. 
26) Group of Twenty, Communiqué (Dec. 15-16, 1999), available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/1999/ 1999co
mmunique.pdf (introducing the outcome of the G20’s inaugural meeting and agreement on the need for 
widespread implementation of financial policy). 
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(Basel Committee or BCBS)28) were enacted and implemented ahead of 
reforms developed in most other countries.  As a result, there is a significant 
and possibly growing divergence between the standards being enforced in the 
United States and those in place or being contemplated around the world.  
This in turn has generated a high degree of concern for regulators outside 
the U.S. and multinational financial companies, whether they be foreign or 
U.S.-based.29)
Capital and liquidity requirements are still in the process of detailed 
finalization under the international framework known as Basel III, yet U.S. 
requirements are already coming into force and they apply to foreign banks 
operating in the United States as well as the consolidated operations of U.S. 
banks operating in many other countries. The Collins Amendment30) in 
Dodd-Frank imposes a floor on consolidated capital adequacy standards, 
respecting both the types of eligible capital and minimum leverage ratios.  
These standards extend the minimum requirements imposed by bank 
regulators on the banks themselves to the holding company conglomerates 
that own banks.31)
27) Mandate, Fin. Stability Bd., http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/mandate.htm (U.K.) (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2012) (detailing the purpose and obligations of the FSB and its members). 
28) Basel Comm.on Banking Supervision, History of the Basel Committee and Its Membership, Bank for Int’l 
Settlement (Aug. 2009), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf (explaining the BCBS’s non-authoritative role 
of ensuring "that no foreign banking establishment should escape supervision").
29) This concern is somewhat mitigated by memoranda of understanding between the U.S. Treasury and other 
governments on how FATCA, for example, should be implemented. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Joint 
Statement from the United States and Japan Regarding a Framework for Intergovernmental Cooperation 
to Facilitate the Implementation of FATCA and Improve International Tax Compliance (June 21, 2012), avai
lable at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/FATCA%20Joint%20Statement% 20
US-Japan.pdf. A similar agreement has been reached with Switzerland. See Samuel Rubenfeld, Treasury 
Gets Japanese and Swiss Banks to Agree on FATCA Compliance Method, Wall St. J. Corruption Currents 
Blog (June 21, 2012, 5:54 PM), available at http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/06/21/treasury- 
gets-japanese-and-swiss-banks-to-agree-on-fatca-compliance-method/.
30) Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 § 171, 12 U.S.C. § 5371 (Supp. 201
1).
31) The Collins Amendment sets the minimum leverage and risk-based capital requirements at the levels requir
ed for insured depository institutions, which are primarily regulated by the FDIC, and applies them to 
bank holding companies and nonbank financial companies under Board supervision.
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The new framework for regulating systemic risk permits the FSOC to 
identify foreign financial companies, under certain circumstances, as posing 
a threat to the stability of the U.S. financial system.32) If such companies 
are so designated, then the components that operate in the United States 
will become subject to rigorous new regulatory standards applied by the 
FED,33) irrespective of the regulatory framework to which the overall 
conglomerates are subject in their home jurisdictions.34) 
In an effort to mitigate the consequences if a financial institution fails, 
foreign banks operating in the U.S. are also subject to a new requirement 
that they develop orderly resolution plans, so-called "living wills,"indicating 
how they can be broken up for resolution if they fail.35) These plans must 
be approved by U.S. regulators and may or may not accord with the 
bankruptcy requirements of their home countries.36) 
The first is the complex web of provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act’s title 
on anti-money-laundering (AML),37) implemented in the wake of the attack 
32) Dodd-Frank Act § 113(b). Such companies need not necessarily be bank holding companies. For example, 
in the U.S.,AIG, GE Capital and General Electric Co. are almost certainly going to be designated as syste
mically important. See Cheyenne Hopkins & Ian Katz, U.S. Said Set to Target First Non-Bank Firms for 
Scrutiny, Bloomberg (Sept. 12, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-11/ u-s-said-se
t-to-target-first-non-bank-firms-for-scrutiny.html.
33) Dodd-Frank Act § 165.
34) Under Dodd-Frank, bank holding companies that own a total of $50 billion in consolidated assets, whether 
they be U.S.-based or foreign bank holding companies with U.S. operations, are defined as "systemically 
important" (SI) and, as a result, are subject to "enhanced supervision" by the FED and other potential syste
mic oversight provisions specifically related to SIs. Id  Foreign nonbank financial companies with U.S. ope
rations are also subject to these provisions if designated by the FSOC as SIs. Id. § 115.
35) Id. § 165(d). See also Title I and IDI Resolution Plans, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., http://www.fdic.gov/ regu
lations/reform/resplans/index.html (last updated Oct. 2, 2012). 
36) Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation, Cooperation and the Exchange of Information 
Related to the Resolution of Insured Depository Institutions with Cross-Border Operations in the United 
States and the United Kingdom (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/ 2010/p
r10013a.pdf.
37) Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Ter
rorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 301-77, 115 Stat. 272, 296-342.  See also Patriot 
Act, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriot Act#Title III: Anti-money-laundering to prevent terroris
m (last updated Oct. 10, 2012) (providing a summary of Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act). 
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on the World Trade Center Towers in New York on September 11, 2001,and 
the laws of New York State that together seek to prevent money laundering 
by criminal organizations—terrorist ones in particular—through the banking 
system.38) Certain countries, such as Iran, have been designated as barred 
from using financial networks in the United States.39) Because such a large 
volume of international wire transfers take place through the clearing 
system in New York, this means that foreign banks, even though they might 
be conducting business entirely outside of the U.S., have found that they 
must comply with these AML provisions (including disclosure of the origin of 
funds) if they wish to make use of the New York clearing network.  As we 
have seen with the recent fines levied on HSBC and Standard Chartered, 
and in the continuing investigation of a number of other foreign banks, 
foreign financial organizations have found themselves to be in violation of 
U.S. law when they have conducted so-called "U-turn"transactions in which 
the data of origin has been stripped out of the funds transfers.40) In the 
case of Standard Chartered, there was loud protest to the effect that the 
U.S.was imposing its will on foreign countries in determining with which the 
banking organizations for those countries could do business.41) 
38) 31 C.F.R. § 560.516 (2012); N.Y. Banking Law §§ 200-c, 672.1 (Mc Kinney 2012); N.Y. Penal Law §§ 175.1
0, 175.35, 195.05 (Mc Kinney 2012); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 3, § 300.1 (2012).
39) Note the extensive impact on financial institutions of the new Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-158, 126 Stat. 1214. See Davis Polk, United States Enacts Further Sanct
ions on Iran and Syria:  The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Davis Polk (Sept. 
12, 2012), http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/3f518309-4693-4d18-b249-0071670c47df/ Presentation
/PublicationAttachment/909ac3e2-d352-402b-b3a5-00dac7c63bd5/091212_Sanctions_Iran_and_Syria.pdf. 
40) See Irene Chapple & Ben Rooney, Standard Chartered Pays $340M to Settle Money Laundering Charges, 
CNN (Aug. 15, 2012, 9:57 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/08/07/business/standard-chartered-iran- allegati
ons/index.html Tiffany Kary & Greg Farrell, HSBC in Settlement Talks with U.S. Over Money Laundering, 
Bloomberg (Aug. 24, 2012, 9:37 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-24/hsbc-in- settlement-tal
ks-with-u-s-over-money-laundering.html. 
41) Most notable was the quote extracted by regulators from interactions within one bank holding company:  
"You f---ing Americans.  Who are you to tell us, the rest of the world, that we’re not going to deal with 
Iranians." Standard Chartered Bank, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Serv. 4 (Aug. 7, 2012) (order) (quoting a Group 
Director from Standard Charter Bank in response to the order), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/r
esources/documents/SCBorder0806.pdf.
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The second example is the compliance regime created by the Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) provisions of the Hiring Incentives 
Act of 2010. FATCA requires the U.S. Treasury and Internal Revenue 
Service to develop complicated rules that apply to foreign financial 
institutions42) and govern transactional reporting and tax withholding on 
investments and pass through payments made by foreign financial 
institutions to certain non-financial institutions. These provisions have 
created difficulties in tracing and reporting on such "passthru" payments 
when they filter through many tiers of intermediaries. They impose 
extensive due diligence burdens in identifying the U.S. or foreign status of 
the recipient entities. And the reporting requirements conflict with some 
data privacy laws abroad.43) 
Ⅲ. The Volcker Rule and New Derivatives Margin 
Requirements
The most visible of the "extraterritorial" rules to come out of the 
Dodd-Frank process so far are those contained in the proposed regulations 
under the Volcker Rule and the margin requirements for OTC derivatives.  
Under U.S. law, there is a general presumption against extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law, and the U.S. Supreme Court applied this 
42) See Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), Internal Revenue Service, http://www.irs.gov/ Busines
ses/Corporations/Foreign-Account-Tax-Compliance-Act-(FATCA) (last updated Sept. 25, 2012).
43) The U.S., France, Germany and U.K., together with several other countries, have reached a new Model 
Intergovernmental Agreement to support the implementation of FATCA. See Model Intergovernmental Agr
eement to Improve Tax Compliance and to Implement FATCA, U.S. Dep’t of Treas. (July 25, 2012), http://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Model-1A-Agreement-to-Implemen
t-Reciprocal-7-25-2012.pdf. See also Karen M. Kroll, New Intergovernmental Agreement to Support FATCA, 
Bus. Fin. (Aug. 16, 2012), http://businessfinancemag.com/article/new-intergovernmental-agreement -suppo
rt-fatca-0816.
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presumption as recently as 2010, in Morrison v. National Australia Bank 
Ltd.44) Congress, however, responded in the Dodd-Frank Act by specifically 
anticipating that the restrictions of the Volcker and OTC/swaps rules could 
have extraterritorial application on banks doing business outside of the 
United States if the activities in question have direct and significant 
connection with activities in the U.S., or in the discretion of the enforcing 
agencies extraterritorial application is necessary in order to prevent evasion 
of regulations developed under Dodd-Frank.45) 
1. Volcker Rule46)
The Volcker Rule is sometimes described as an effort to reintroduce the 
old Glass-Steagall framework47) into banking regulation in the U.S.—in 
effect to recreate a strict separation of the banking and the securities 
industry. In fact the Rule is rather narrower and seeks to prohibit banking 
conglomerates that own insured depository institutions from engaging in 
proprietary trading of securities (i.e.,trading for their own account and not 
merely on behalf of customers) and from investing in private equity firms or 
hedge funds. The idea is to keep banks out of what are perceived to be 
highly speculative—and therefore excessively risky—financial activities.
From the moment it was announced,48) the Volcker Rule has been highly 
44) Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).  The Supreme Court refused to interpret 
section 10(b) of the Securities & Exchange Act of 1934 to have extraterritorial effect.
45) Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 722(d), 
772(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1673, 1802. The Act also called for further study of the problem of extraterritorialit
y, so it is clear that Congress was well aware of the impact such regulation might have on foreign banks 
in their foreign operations. Id. §§ 752(a), 719(c).
46) Id. § 619.
47) Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, §§ 20, 32 (1933) (repealed 1999); id. §§ 16, 21 (amended 1999). 
These four sections are collectively referred to as the Glass-Steagall framework and often analogized to 
the Volcker Rule. The framework restricted banks from dealing in, underwriting, and distributing certain 
securities but did not restrict proprietary trading, which is a focus of the Volcker Rule. The Volcker Rule 
also permits dealing in certain securities that were otherwise restricted by the Glass-Steagall framework.
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controversial for a number of reasons. First, it is by no means clear that 
proprietary trading or hedge fund activities had anything to do with the 
financial collapse of 2008. Second, proprietary trading is a necessary 
component of risk management as banks trade securities continually in order 
to hedge the risks in their portfolios, so drawing a distinction between 
trading that properly hedges risks and trading that is purely speculative or 
designed to reap profits is a difficult—some might even say impossible—
task. Third, to the extent that the Volcker Rule recognizes this risk 
management activity, the proposed implementing regulations have created 
exceptions that have become so convoluted that many bankers believe them 
to be unmanageable. Fourth, in order to police securities trading activities, 
the proposed rules implementing Volcker would impose compliance 
requirements that many consider to be unnecessarily expensive, distracting, 
ineffective and perhaps truly nightmarish. Finally, while it is recognized 
that banks should be able to engage in so-called "seed funding"in order to 
promote new business ventures, the "de minimus" exception49) provided in 
the act to investment in hedge and private equity funds is very large in 
practice when it is applied to very big banks (three percent of total capital), 
so the Volcker Rule actually favors larger financial institutions at precisely 
the moment when banking scale has become very polemical.
In addition to these implementation problems, the Volcker Rule also 
48) Press Release, White House, President Obama Calls for New Restrictions on Size and Scope of Financial 
Institutions to Rein in Excesses and Protect Taxpayers (Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/president-obama-calls-new-restrictions-size-and-scope-financial-institutions-rein-e Edwar
d Luce & Tom Braithwaite, "Volcker Rule" Takes Bankers by Surprise, Fin. Times (Jan. 21, 2010, 6:44 PM) 
(U.K.), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0af8ad12-06ba-11df-b426- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz283vyLDRs. The 
Volcker Rule can be traced to a report written by The Group of Thirty in January 2009. Group of Thirty, 
Financial Reform: A Framework for Financial Stability(Jan. 2009), available at http://www.group30.org/ima
ges/PDF/Financial Reform-A Framework for Financial Stability.pdf. Paul Volcker was Chairman of the Trus
tees for the Group and, soon after, led President Obama’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board. As Luce 
and Braithwaite state, Volcker pushed for far-reaching reform and even criticized Obama’s proposals durin
g the year between the report’s release and Obama’s announcement.
49) Dodd-Frank Act § 619. 
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wreaks havoc with the activities of foreign banks if they have any presence 
in the United States.50) This is because they will only be exempt from the 
Rule’s prohibitions if the activities in question have no connection with the 
U.S.—either territorial or corporate. Furthermore, the Volcker Rule exempts 
United States securities, but not the sovereign debt of any other country or 
even other U.S. political subdivisions or governmental agencies, from its 
proprietary trading restrictions.51) This is seen both as a threat to the 
ability of foreign governments to be able to place debt and a preferential 
favoring of U.S. government debt.52) 
It is therefore no surprise that every foreign bank with any kind of 
significant presence in the U.S. is concerned about the Rule’s impact on its 
operations. Indeed, some global banks, including most notably Deutsche 
Bank, have already restructured and moved certain activities away from the 
U.S.in order to avoid the full impact of the Rule.53)
2. OTC Derivatives
50) For a thorough analysis of the extraterritorial impacts of the Volcker Rule, see, e.g., Edward F. Greene 
& Ilona Potiha, Examining the Extraterritorial Reach of Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule and Margin Rules for 
Uncleared Swaps—a Call for Regulatory Coordination and Cooperation, 7 Cap. Mkts. L.J. 271, 283-92 (201
2).  
51) Dodd-Frank Act § 619.
52) See Zachary A. Goldfarb & Howard Schneider, Local, Foreign Governments Slam Volcker Rule, Wash. Pos
t, Feb. 29, 2012, at A12; Volcker Rule Threatens Sovereign Debt Liquidity-BoJ, Reuters (Mar. 5, 2012, 10:58 
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/05/usa-financial-regulation-idUSL2E8E55E120120305 Daniel Fl
ynn & Elinor Comlay, Volcker Rule Should Exclude All Sovereign Debt-Citigroup, Reuters (Feb. 25, 2012, 
5:26 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/25/us-g20-volcker-idUSTRE81O0P120120225.
53) Generally, a foreign-based global bank has a bank holding company registered in the host country. To 
avoid the new capital requirements, the global bank moves the banking activities that trigger compliance 
from under the holding company to another entity that is a direct subsidiary of the foreign-based parent 
company. The holding company is no longer a bank holding company subject to the new capital levels. 
See David Enrich & Laura Stevens, Deutsche Avoids Dodd-Frank Rule --- German Bank Restructures U.S. 
Unit to Avoid New Capital Requirements; Regulators Don't Object, Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 2012, at C1 David 
Enrich, Banks Find Loophole on Capital Rule --- Foreign Lenders Weigh Restructuring to Free Up Cash; 
a Footnote in Barclays's Finance Statement, Wall St. J. Feb. 18, 2011, at C1.  
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Dodd-Frank’s rules for derivatives have also raised substantial 
controversy. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and 
Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) share responsibility for the 
regulation of derivatives.  The CFTC is the primary regulator for swaps, the 
SEC is primary for securities-based swaps, and both agencies jointly 
regulate so-called "mixed swaps." Dodd-Frank requires the CFTC and the 
SEC to develop an extensive system of OTC derivatives regulation, including 
centralized clearing systems, the registration of swap dealers and market 
participants, capital and margin requirements, and the public reporting of 
transactions and pricing for both cleared and uncleared swaps.  Essentially, 
two types of restraints have been introduced:
- entity-based restrictions (registration of swap dealers and major swap 
participants); and
- transactions-based rules (capital, liquidity, margin, risk management, 
margin segregation, clearing and trading).54) 
To illustrate the potential extraterritorial effects of this regulatory regime, 
we will focus on the margin and collateral requirements being developed by 
the CFTC.55) The CFTC’s proposed rules will impose significant margin 
requirements on collateral for uncleared swaps. This will in turn likely 
transform the business because posting greater quality collateral than is 
presently the practice will raise the cost of conducting the derivatives 
business.56) Importantly for the present audience, these proposed 
54) For a helpful comparative review of the new U.S.and European Union derivatives regulation regimes, see 
David Felsenthal, Regulation of OTC Derivatives Markets—EU vs US Initiatives, Harv. L. Sch. Forum on 
Corp. Gov. & Fin. Reg. (Sept. 23, 2012, 10:32 AM), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/09/23/ re
gulation-of-otc-derivatives-markets-eu-vs-us-initiatives/.
55) For a recent review of the status of these rules, see, e.g., Ben Protess, In New Rules to Shine Light on 
Derivatives, Regulators Also Allow Exemptions, N.Y. Times, Jul. 11, 2012, at B1.  
56) Indeed, these new requirements have already spawned a whole new "collateral transformation"market, in 
terms of which banks will loan derivatives users the kind of quality collateral they need to conform to 
the new requirements, holding the inadequate collateral in exchange and charging a fee for the "transform
ation." See Bradley Keoun, Big Banks Hide Risk Transforming Collateral for Traders, Bloomberg News (Se
pt. 11, 2012, 8:43 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-10/big-banks-hide-risk- transforming-coll
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requirements would have direct extraterritorial effect in all cases except 
where the swap transaction is between two entities neither of which is 
controlled in any way by a U.S. entity and only when the transaction takes 
place outside of the U.S. Such a requirement would effectively require all 
the global banks with any kind of U.S. presence to comply with the proposed 
rules. If the entity in question is organized via a global branch network,57) 
and one of its branches is in the U.S., the entire global network becomes 
subject to the restrictions even if the transaction takes place entirely beyond 
the shores of the U.S.
Ⅳ. Political Winds in the United States
Because reform of financial regulation is one of the centerpieces of the 
current presidential and congressional election campaigns in the United 
States, it is important to take these political winds into account.  The 
elections will take place soon—on November 6, 2012.  
The Republican candidates for president and vice president, Mitt Romney 
and Paul Ryan, have regularly stated their opposition to the Dodd-Frank 
framework58) and the House Republicans on the Financial Services 
Committee have repeatedly attempted to repeal the Act.59) A general picture 
ateral-for-traders.html. 
57) Branch networks, as opposed to separate corporate subsidiaries, are a much favored organizational structu
re because it facilitates the efficient deployment of capital. 
58) Suzy Khimm, Romney Vows to Repeal Dodd-Frank. The Law’s Biggest Critics Doubt That Will Happen., 
Wash. Post Ezra Klein’s Wonkblog (Aug. 10, 2012, 1:39 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ ezra-
klein/wp/2012/08/10/romney-vows-to-repeal-dodd-frank-the-laws-biggest-critics-doubt-that-will-happen/ Phil 
Mattingly, Romney’s Dodd-Frank Kill Pledge Collides with Wall Street Agenda, Bloomberg (Aug. 29, 2012, 
10:52 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-30/romney-s-dodd-frank-kill-pledge-collides- with-wa
ll-street-agenda.html Andrew Ross Sorkin, Everything Wall St. Should Know About Ryan, N.Y. Times Deal
Book (Aug. 13, 2012, 10:26 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/13/paul-ryan-and-what- wall-street-
should-know/. 
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of the alternative framework they envision is emerging. Like many other 
public policy issues, this vision, though not always coherent, stands in stark 
contrast to that of the incumbent President, Barak Obama, the 
Congressional Democrats, and the system created by Dodd-Frank.
The prevailing concept of financial regulation enshrined in the Dodd-Frank 
framework and defended by the Democrats, is essentially this: The stability 
of the domestic and global financial systems can be maintained by smarter 
"systemic risk"regulation involving more proactive financial monitoring 
through the new OFR and a collective consideration by the large FSOC of 
emerging risks to stability. Enhanced capital adequacy and liquidity 
provisions, orderly resolution planning, the separation of proprietary trading 
from banking by deposit-taking institutions, and greater posting of collateral 
for derivatives, as many as possible traded through exchanges, is thought to 
minimize the danger of failure by financial institutions no matter how large, 
and to minimize the risk of collateral damage to other financial institutions 
and the financial system when a failure doesoccur. The comprehensive 
oversight of both the bank subsidiaries and corporate conglomerates of such 
institutions, by the OCC, through greatly enhanced powers, and the FED, is 
hoped to ensure greater proactivity and more sophisticated supervision and 
regulation than was proved to be the case before the Crisis. Greater 
consumer and investor protections and stricter standards for mortgage 
underwriting also add to the framework. The creation of the new CFPB was 
seen as a necessary way to focus on government protection of consumers.  
Finally, numerous other, less visible regulations were authorized as well; 
most of these fall within the overall vision of intensified regulation without 
59) "The Committee reported 18 bills to the House that would repeal, reform or fix Dodd-Frank provisions 
that harm the economy. The House passed 7 bills that would reverse Dodd-Frank regulations . . . ." Over
sight of Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, House Fin. Serv. Comm., http://financialservices.house.gov/ dod
d-frank/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2012). See also Dave Clarke, Republicans Target Dodd-Frank for Deficit Savi
ngs, Reuters (Apr. 18, 2012, 7:48 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/18/us-financial- regulation-li
quidation-idUSBRE83H1H820120418.
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significant scale restrictions on the financial industry.
While the approach just described is that adopted by the Democratic Party 
mainstream, including most Democrats in Congress, it should also be noted 
that there is a strong, more radical movement, "Occupy Wall Street" (OWS
),60) which appears to take the position, along with some Democratic Party 
lawmakers,61) that effective financial reform would likely require the 
breakup of very large financial institutions as well.62) 
The Republican vision is in some important respects quite different.63) 
Both Congressional Republicans and the Republican presidential and vice 
presidential candidates have spoken frequently against the general approach 
taken by Dodd-Frank. There is, however, a bifurcation in the views held 
among the Republicans. The Tea Party wing and, until recently, the vice 
presidential candidate Paul Ryan have vehemently opposed the bailouts 
extended to large financial institutions.64) Like the liberal wing of the 
60) About, Occupy Wall St., http://occupywallst.org(last visited Oct. 10, 2012).  OWS is not officially aligned 
with the Democratic Party, but its members tend to lean toward the Left. 
61) In November 2009 Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) introduced a bill entitled the Too Big to Fail, Too Big 
to Exist Act, which would have required the Treasury Secretary to compile a list of financial institutions, 
including banks that should be broken up. S. 2746, 111th Cong. (2009).  In April 2010, Senators Sherrod 
Brown (D-OH) and Ted Kaufmann (D-DE) lead the introduction of an amendment to the Dodd-Frank Bill 
that would have imposed strict leverage and nondeposit liabilities caps on large banks, effectively forcing 
the breakup of America’s largest banks (JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup and Bank of America). S. 3241, 111th 
Cong. (2010). See also Tim Fernholz, TAP Talks with Sen. Kaufmann, Am. Prospect (Apr. 29, 2010), http:/
/prospect.org/article/tap-talks-sen-kaufman. The amendment was defeated. See Audie Cornish, Senate Kills 
Bid to Limit Size of Banks, Nat’l Pub. Radio (May 6, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/ story/story.ph
p?storyId=126581763. 
62) See, e.g., Gary Rivlin, Which Bank Is the Worst?, Daily Beast (Oct. 25, 2011, 6:48 PM), http://www.thedail
ybeast.com/articles/2011/10/25/why-occupy-wall-street-hates-the-big-banks.html.
63) From its enactment, senior Republican Representatives in the House have declared their intention to repeal 
Dodd-Frank and prevent the necessary funding, and the House itself has actually voted to pass such legisl
ation. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Dodd-Frank Act a Favorite Target for Republicans Laying Blame, N.Y. Tim
es, Sept. 21, 2011, at B1 J.C. Boggs, Melissa Foxman, & Kathleen Nahill, Dodd-Frank At One Year: Growi
ng Pains, 2 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. Online 52 (2011), http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/ 07/Boggs
-Foxman-Nahill-Growing-Pains.pdf. 
64) Suzy Khimm, Paul Ryan Voted for the Bailouts, but Has Since Soured on Them, Wash. Post Ezra Klein’s 
Wonkblog (Aug. 13, 2012, 3:19 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/08/13/pau
l-ryan-voted-for-the-bailouts-but-hes-since-soured-on-them/ Dunstan Prial, Occupy Wall Street, Tea Party M
ovements Both Born of Bank Bailouts, Fox Bus. (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.foxbusiness.com/ markets/20
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Democratic Party,65) they favor imposing scale restrictions on large financial 
institutions in an endeavor to eliminate the "Too Big to Fail"(TBTF) status 
of these banks and thereby reduce pressure for government assistance when 
such institutions get into difficulties. At the same time, the candidate for 
President, Mitt Romney, has avoided speaking out against large financial 
institutions—perhaps because he receives substantial funding from such 
entities and their employees.66) In a nutshell, the Republicans place more 
faith in the ability of markets to regulate modern banking, whereas the 
Democrats believe there is an additional need for extensive government 
regulation in order to prevent financial instability, bank failure and 
customer abuse.
For who will prevail, a lot will turn on the results of the November 
elections. If President Obama wins another term it is likely, no matter what 
happens in congressional races, that the current framework will continue, 
including a continuation of the implementation of both the Volcker Rule and 
derivatives restrictions.67) Continuing domestic political pressure might also 
encourage further unilateral action by the U.S., even if this action creates 
extraterritorial impacts.
If, on the other hand, Mitt Romney wins the election, and especially if the 
Republicans win both the House and Senate (an unclear prospect68)), we 
11/10/19/occupy-wall-street-tea-party-born-bank-bailouts/ Brad Bannon, Bank Bailout Spawned Obama an
d Dems’ Tea Party Problem, U.S. News (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/ blogs/brad-ban
non/2010/09/09/Bank-Bailout-Spawned-Obama-and-Dems-Tea-Party-Problem.  
65) See, e.g., the OWS movement and Democratic Senators who have attempted to impose size limits on ban
ks, supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
66) According to the Center for Responsive Politics, all five of Romney’s top contributors are major banking 
institutions and Obama’s top five list consistsof universities, technology companies, and the federal govern
ment. 2012 Presidential Race, Ctr. for Responsive Politics, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/ index.php 
(last visited Oct. 11, 2012). Furthermore, the Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate sector has contributed $14,
573,265 to Obama (3.37% of total raised) and $40,098,729 to Romney (14.35% of total raised). Id.
67) It is also likely, however, that if the Republican party secures a majority on one or both houses of Congre
ss, the funding for much of the Dodd-Frank regulatory framework will be restricted by hostile congression
al committees, as will the appointments process for heads of the financial agencies.  
68) General Election: Romney vs. Obama, RealClearPolitics, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2012/ pres
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will almost surely see a roll back of Dodd-Frank in favor of some kind of 
deregulation, perhaps along more sophisticated lines than were in place 
during the deregulatory era of the 1990s and run up to the Crisis.69) At the 
same time, because of their continuing political power and their contribution 
to a Romney win it is unlikely that the very large banks will be dismantled 
unless another major financial institution failure were to occur and this 
disaster were to scare politicians into taking more aggressive action.
Given the strength that the Tea Party wing will have gained in an election 
win, however, one might also expect the debate over bank size to remain as 
vigorous as ever.70) The drift toward greater extraterritorial impact is likely 
to slow down tothe extent that rules such as Volcker and OTC swaps are 
themselves possibly to lose their force, but any decline in extraterritorial 
impacts are going to be a by-product of this process, not something treated 
as a material domestic issue in the U.S..
ident/us/general_election_romney_vs_obama-1171.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (showing a historical gr
aph of polls which indicates that Obama had been increasing his lead throughout September but then 
lost that lead in early October).
69) Even if unable to repeal Dodd-Frank because it cannot muster a sufficient majority to defeat an almost 
certain filibuster, the majority party in either house of Congress can substantially impede the implementati
on and enforcement of the legislation by denying the necessary funding. For example, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission has struggled to implement its own mandates under the Dodd-Frank Act because 
it has not received the appropriations authorized in the legislation. Mark Schoeff Jr., SEC Gets Low-Balled 
by Appropriations Committee, Inv. News (June 21, 2012, 3:30 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/articl
e/20120620/FREE/120629991.  On the other hand, one should also not underestimate the degree of imple
mentation that has already taken place, as well as the momentum within the agencies for completing their 
mandates and the fact that financial firms have already adapted to much of the change.
70) Congressman Paul Ryan, Governor Mitt Romney’s running mate, was opposed to the financial bailouts in 
2008 and has, until recently, declared his strong opposition to banks that are "too big to fail."  See, e.g., 
Sorkin, supra note 57. 
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V. Dilemmas of Modern Global Banking and Financial 
Regulation
Irrespective of ideological and political divisions within the U.S., in many 
ways the controversies and conflicts regarding extraterritorial impact and 
the disagreements concerning such restrictions as the Volcker Rule are the 
inevitable consequence of the globalization of finance. 
This globalization is manifested by many factors. Global networks enable 
transactions to occur almost seamlessly and instantly across borders; yet 
these same networks create the danger of contagion and cascading failures, 
which can in turn quickly lead to regional and even global financial 
instability. Giant financial institutions have combined most types of 
financial services within single overarching conglomerates and they now also 
conduct their operations on a global scale; yet this makes it very difficult to 
impose domestic restrictions on the forms and activities of such institutions 
without impairing their competitiveness and, to the extent that foreign 
financial institutions compete directly within those very jurisdictions, 
without creating extraterritorial effects as a result of such domestic 
restrictions. Governments raise debt in financial markets throughout the 
world; yet this makes any effort to privilege specific domestic sovereign 
debt, as is the case with the Volcker Rule, inevitably (and probably 
correctly) perceived to be extraterritorial discrimination. Finally, banking 
conglomerates consist of large corporate entities headquartered in many 
parts of the world; yet this makes any failure, as we saw with Lehman 
Brothers,71) a matter for multiple jurisdictions, each of which presently has 
a separate bankruptcy regime so that the application of any one regime over 
71) Sam Mamudi, Lehman Folds with Record $613 Billion Debt, MarketWatch (Sept. 15, 2008, 10:11 AM), http:
//www.marketwatch.com/story/lehman-folds-with-record-613-billion-debt?siteid=rss. 
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others inevitably favors classes of creditors differently.
This leads one to ask whether there is any way out of this dilemma?  
Various solutions have been proffered.  
The most far reaching has been carefully and elegantly developed by 
Emilios Avgouleas in his recently published book, Governance of Global 
Financial Markets.72) He sees no alternative but to develop a global 
regulatory system to match the global reach of banks within a world of 
globalized finance. Professor Avgouleas’concept is complex: he suggests the 
creation of new international institutions and the modification of some 
others existing ones. He proposes a new governing council representing the 
World Bank, United Nations, the European Union and members of the G20.  
This council would oversee four new entities:  
- a macroprudential (financial stability) regulator;
- a microprudential (safety/soundness and market conduct) regulator;
- a knowledge-gathering and policy-development organization; and 
- a global resolution authority for dealing with large-scale financial 
bankruptcies.73)
An intermediate position has of course been developed by the European 
Union and, until recently, consisted essentially of home country regulation 
with home country rules being exportable to host countries on the basis of 
a single, European "banking passport."74) With the difficulties now faced by 
banks in the Eurozone, however, the European Commission has announced 
72) Emilios Avgouleas, Governance of Global Financial Markets (2012).  
73) Id.ch.8.
74) According to the European Commission, "the ‘single passport,’[is] a system which allows financial services 
operators legally established in one Member State to establish/provide their services in the other Member 
States without further authorisation requirements." Banking, Eur. Comm’n, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_ma
rket/bank/index_en.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2012). In 2010, the European Parliament passed reforms des
igned to improve assessment of trading risks, raise capital requirements, and address compensation that 
incentivizes taking high risks. Directive 2010/76/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
November 2010 Amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as Regards Capital Requirements for the 
Trading Book and for Re-securitisations, and the Supervisory Review of Remuneration Policies, 2010 O.J. 
(L 329) 3.  
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a new framework that will be implemented in part by the beginning of next 
year. In terms of this announcement there will be a single, European bank 
regulator with direct authority over all 6000 European banks irrespective of 
where they are headquartered.75) Whether this proposal is accepted remains 
to be seen. For example, it is possible that the U.K. might not fully 
participate.76) 
The approach that has generally prevailed to the present has been a broad 
system of consolidated home country supervision, subject to default 
provisions applied by host countries where home country action is deemed 
insufficient.77) This is the system developed at the international level by the 
BCBS and it is largely enshrined in the U.S. by the Foreign Bank 
Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991,78) enacted in reaction to the scandal 
surrounding the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), a 
global criminal enterprise that masqueraded as a banking organization but 
was able to evade detection for some time because it could engage in 
regulatory arbitrage at a time when international coordination and 
standards were very informal.79) 
Such a system of host country deference to home country primacy, 
together with a host country override, always carries the potential for 
75) See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Commission Proposes New ECB Powers for Banking Supervision as Part 
of a Banking Union (Sept. 12, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/953.  
76) For growing tensions over the proposal, see, e.g., David Cameron: We Won't Take Part in EU Banking 
Union - It's Not Our Currency, Telegraph (June 7, 2012, 5:00 PM) (U.K.), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
news/politics/david-cameron/9317418/David-Cameron-We-wont-take-part-in-EU-banking-union-its-not-our-c
urrency.html John O’Donnell, European Lawmakers Warn of Banking Union Split, Reuters (Sept. 26, 2012, 
7:24 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/26/us-eu-banks-idUSBRE88P0NM20120926 John O’Donn
ell, Regulator Warns Banking Union Could Split Europe, Reuters (Sept. 19, 2012, 11:20 PM), http://in.reute
rs.com/article/2012/09/19/eu-eba-ecb-banks-idINDEE88I0F320120919. See also Gareth Jones, ECB Should 
Only Supervise Big Banks: Schaeuble, Reuters (Sept. 3, 2012, 1:20 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/20
12/09/03/us-eurozone-banks-schaeuble-idUSBRE88204U20120903 (stating Germany’s reservations about incl
uding smaller banks within the banking union’s supervision).
77) Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act (FBSEA) of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, §§ 201-15; Basel Comm
ittee on Banking Supervision, supra note 27. 
78) FBSEA §§ 201-15. 
79) S. Rep. No. 102-140 (1992). 
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unilateral action, with potential extraterritorial effect, by a host country 
whenever it deems the actions taken by home countries to be inadequate to 
meet its concerns. The FATCA, AML and Volcker provisions represent just 
such a judgment.
In my view, none of these solutions is satisfying. Professor Avgouleas’ 
proposal would take many years to negotiate, let alone bring into effect. It 
would also rely on a complicated bureaucratic apparatus of which many 
might be skeptical as to whether it would be any more efficient and 
trustworthy than the complicated chaos we have now.
The European bank regulator proposal, like the Dodd-Frank framework, 
places its faith in the ability of traditional, command and control regulators, 
governing through detailed rules, to react effectively to rapidly changing 
market conditions. While it is a reaffirmation of the importance of vigorous 
government regulation and supervision, given the cumbersome responses of 
the Eurozone authorities to their own current crisis it is something of a leap 
of faith to assume that a large agency would improve the situation—at least 
across a wider region than the Eurozone—even if it had more direct powers.  
Furthermore, given the closeness many banks in many countries have to 
their governments, it is hard to avoid the suspicion that the actions 
produced by such a regulator would not have a substantial range of biases 
in favor of individual sovereign stability.80) 
My own view is that the best hope for effective global action is actually 
the path already being followed, albeit with fewer, simpler rules and 
standards.81) Though slow and frustrating, the work being done by the FSB 
80) Several countries have expressed opposition because the banking union as proposed would carry an obvi
ous bias to voting members of the EU. See Alex Barker & Richard Milne, Eurozone ‘Outs’ Fear Banking 
Union Plan, Fin. Times (Oct. 1, 2012 6:56 PM) (U.K.), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/18afcedc- 071f-11e2-92ef-
00144feabdc0,Authorised=false.html?i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2F18afcedc-
071f-11e2-92ef-00144feabdc0.html&_i_referer=#axzz283vyLDRs Sweden Skeptical on EU Banking Union Pla
ns, Reuters (Sept. 15, 2012, 12:48 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/15/ us-sweden-nordea-idUS
BRE88E0DW20120915 Adéla Zábražná, Banking Union Plans Irk ČR, Prague Post (Sept. 26, 2012) (Czech), 
http://www.praguepost.com/business/14373-banking-union-plans-irk-cr.html.
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and Basel Committee, coupled with that of the IMF and World Bank,82) can 
gradually produce a set of meaningful standards for all nations to follow in 
their own way. These standards will not be the types that are immediately 
enforceable; indeed, they would take years to acquire strong normative 
force.  In the mean time, I would argue that it is only realistic to accept the 
fact that there will be considerable variations from country to country, 
except in those areas where emergency contingency planning between 
nations is essential. 
The absence of a global authority with executive powers and the ability of 
each national jurisdiction to adopt variations on such standards do indeed 
make regulatory arbitrage possible. Such situation also carries the inevitable 
likelihood of complaints about extraterritoriality, not to mention complaints 
by global financial institutions that their compliance and operating costs are 
higher because of uneven requirements in each jurisdiction.83) But the 
diversification that such an approach permits is, in this commentator’s view, 
politically more realistic than tighter efforts at integration and 
harmonization. Such diversification might also offer the hope that better 
jurisdictions will demonstrate their superiority when the next financial crisis 
occurs.  
In other words, I would still favor a degree of regional differentiation and 
adaptation as something more suitable for constantly evolving markets, as 
well as something more manageable from a political point of view. Such a 
result might understandably not be palatable to some regulators, who are 
left to deal with transnational inconsistencies, or some global financial 
81) Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir. for Fin. Stability, Bank Eng., Address at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kans
as City’s Economic Policy Symposium: The Dog and the Frisbee (Aug. 31, 2012).
82) Financial Assessment Program, World Bank, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/ EXTFI
NANCIALSECTOR/0,,contentMDK:22142161~menuPK:6459396~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:28288
5,00.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2012). See also Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works 
(And How It Doesn’t), 99 Geo. L.J. 257, 281-81 (2011). 
83) Note that this does not necessarily imply greater "efficiency" because some of the true costs are externalize
d if no local compliance requirements are imposed. 
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organizations, which also have to manage regional differentiations in their 
operations. At this point, however, the notion of a seamless global regulator 
and harmonious global rules seem to be an ideal and not a realistic 
immediate prospect, if it will ever be.
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A Current Assessment of Some Extraterritorial Impacts of 
The Dodd- Frank Act with Special Focus on The Volcker Rule 
and Derivatives Regulation
Lawrence G. Baxter
As the world struggles to emerge from the Global Financial Crisis the vision of a harmonious 
framework of global financial regulation seems as distant as ever.  Important progress made 
by international committees such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the 
Financial Stability Board notwithstanding, there seem to be increasing signs of unilateral, 
extraterritorial action by major jurisdictions, including the United States.  This paper reviews 
the framework created by the US financial reforms, in particular anti money laundering 
provisions, the Volcker Rule and the proposed OTC derivatives margin requirements, and 
considers some of the dilemmas presented by modern global banking and its concomitant 
regulation.  The conclusion is that we are likely to see more regional reforms that are not 
necessarily uniform, and that this might not be a bad result, given the complexity of the 
financial markets and the need to respond flexibly to evolving circumstances.
